In July of 2017, the White House was at a crossroads on the question of Iran. President Trump had made a campaign pledge to leave the “terrible” nuclear deal that President Barack Obama negotiated with Tehran, but prominent members of Trump’s cabinet spent the early months of the administration pushing the mercurial president to negotiate a stronger agreement rather than scotch the deal entirely. Thus far, the forces for negotiation had prevailed. But counterforces were also at work. Stephen K. Bannon, then still an influential adviser to the president, turned to John Bolton to draw up a new Iran strategy that would, as its first act, abrogate the Iran deal. Bolton, a Fox News commentator and former ambassador to the United Nations, had no official role in the administration as of yet, but Bannon saw him as an outside voice that could stiffen Trump’s spine — a kind of back channel to the president who could convince Trump that his Iran policy was adrift.  As a top national security official in the George W. Bush administration, Bolton was one of the architects of regime change in Iraq. He had long called not just for withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or J.C.P.O.A., as the 2015 nuclear deal was known, but also for overthrowing the Iranian regime that negotiated it. Earlier that July, he distilled his views on the matter in Paris, at an annual gathering in support of the fringe exile movement Mujahedeen Khalq, or the M.E.K., which itself had long called for regime change in Iran. Referring to the continuing policy review in Washington, he repeated his belief that the only sufficient American policy in Iran would be to change the Iranian government and whipped the crowd into a standing ovation by pledging that in two years, Iran’s leaders would be gone and that “we here will celebrate in Tehran.”

Former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Sheikholeslam, who has served as Iran's ambassador to Syria, said in an August 27, 2019 interview on Ofogh TV (Iran) that Iran has invested in the "huge defensive and strategic endeavor" of deploying roughly 150,000 missiles in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip that are meant to be launched at Israel at Iran's discretion. He said that since the U.S. has defined Israel's national security as part of its own national security, this strategy is Iran's greatest deterrent against both countries, and he claimed that Israel would have certainly attacked Fordow, Bushehr, and Natanz dozens of times were it not for Iran's missiles in these countries. Sheikholeslam went on to say that a ballistic missile launched from Iran would take eight minutes to get to Israel and would be detected by American and NATO radars in the region. In contrast, he explained that missiles launched from Lebanon would start a rapid descent almost as soon as they can be detected and monitored. In addition, Sheikholeslam said that Iran does not intend to drive Israel into the sea or to use nuclear weapons against it. Rather, he said that Iran's military capabilities are exclusively for purposes of deterrence and that Iran simply wants the Zionists to "understand" that they have violated the rights of the Palestinians and to leave the region, especially since they "have citizenship in several European countries anyway."

In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of the major foreign military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on Iran’s defense and military goals, strategy, plans, and intentions; the organization, structure, and capability of its military supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, our leaders, the national security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.

Russia believes that the idea of establishing a security system in the Gulf area might be essential for consolidating political and diplomatic efforts in this region. It implies a long-term programme of action aimed at normalizing the situation, improving stability and security, resolving conflicts, indentifying key benchmarks and parameters for a future post-crisis architecture, as well as ways to fulfill the related tasks. Our initiative is a follow-up to Russia's proposals worked out in late 1990s and improved in 2004 and 2007.