• 2020-01-14

    The 19-second video published by the New York Times last week showing the moment an Iranian missile hit a passenger jet has prompted much social media skepticism. Questions arise about the improbable timing and circumstances of recording the precise moment when the plane was hit. 

  • 2020-01-13

    The ideological architects of one of the United States’ most disastrous foreign-policy decisions—the 2003 invasion of Iraq—are spinning a tale to support Trump’s most dangerous move to date.

  • 2020-01-13

    The killing of Qassem Soleimani was a monumental blow to the country’s regional ambitions. It could be about to go back to basics in its response

  • 2020-01-13

    Senior Iranian commander Lt. General Qassem Soleimani, who was recently assassinated in a US strike, was posthumously awarded Syria’s top medal of honor by the Arab country’s President Bashar al-Assad.

  • 2020-01-13

    The Trump administration’s claims that it assassinated Gen. Qasem Soleimani because he posed an imminent threat to American lives and was coming to Baghdad to launch an immediate attack the US embassy there have fallen apart. Commentators are suggesting that the “imminent threat” argument is the equivalent for the Trump administration of the “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) claim of the Bush administration in the run-up to the Iraq War. 

  • 2020-01-13

    Speech of Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State. Palo Alto, California; The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. January 13, 2020

  • 2020-01-12

    The Donald Trump administration is ramping up its information war against Venezuela, Iran, and Syria. And it has enlisted social media platforms as weapons in its assault on these top regime-change targets. In the first two weeks of January, Twitter suspended dozens of accounts run by real, live people — not bots — in Venezuela, Iran, and Syria. Those erased from the website included heads of state, numerous state institutions, media outlets, and many average people who do not work for their governments. 

  • 2020-01-12

    At the time of writing nothing is certain except ‘cui bono’.  The same Western powers who cooperated to start this war on Iran by killing Hashd al Shabi soldiers at the key Islamic State border crossing near Al Qaim, and then assassinating Soleimani as he came to Baghdad following their funerals, are now the “beneficiaries” of the Ukraine air disaster. The sympathy for Soleimani expressed by millions of Iranians, Iraqis, Syrians and others around the world, and support for the fight of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard against the Imperial barbarian invaders has now been turned on its head, at least in the Western media and amongst NATO leaders.

  • 2020-01-12

    Najah Mohammed Ali is an Iraqi analyst who lives in London. He believes that Trump was deceived to assassinate General Soleimani, a figure who “belongs to the humanity” for dedicating his life to fight against terrorism. He stressed that some Arab countries are also to be blamed for the assassinations of the popular commander of Quds forces and “should pay a price”. His exclusive interview with Parsi Policy is as follows:...

  • 2020-01-12

    Frankly, the story as presented by the Iranians makes no sense to me (not because I think that they are lying, but because there are a lot of information holes which need to be plugged).  Why did the Iranian civil and military authorities not close down the Iranian airspace (which the US side, by the way, seemed to have done).  Next, did the Iranian air defenses not get all the flight plans of all the aircraft in Iranian space?  I had the privilege to participate in a few air defense exercises as a young man, and not only did we have full access to all the flight plans of any civilian aircraft over all of Europe, we even had their transponder signals live on our main displays.    Was the Ukrainian transponder on?  I strongly suspect that yes as a PIC cannot take off without this instrument in perfect working order (at least this was the case with European airlines in the 80s and 90s). The commander of the SAM unit explained that he had 10 seconds to take a decision and that he got NO order from the higher instances (regimental, divisional, national air defense authorities).  I don’t have any reason to doubt him, but if he indeed speaks the truth, then this shows a glaring weakness of the Iranian air defenses.  Not only was his audio/video call for instructions not answered, the air defense networks were either down or frozen.  HOW could that happen in a theoretically very redundant and highly survivable military network?! Then there is the Ukrainian PIC.  The logical thing for him to do would have been to contact his corporate bosses in Kiev and they might even have contacted the Ukrainian authorities.  The question is WHO and WHY took the decision to take off when the situation was self-evidently fantastically dangerous. Questions, questions and more questions indeed…

Pages