Nuclear Issue

  • 2020-08-26

    After intensive bilateral consultations, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement on the resolution of the safeguards implementation issues specified by the IAEA, in good faith. In this regard, Iran is voluntarily providing the IAEA with access to the two locations specified by the IAEA and facilitating the IAEA verification activities to resolve these issues. Dates for the IAEA access and the verification activities have been agreed. The IAEA verification activities will proceed in accordance with the CSA and the AP, and the IAEA’s standard verification practice as implemented for all States with CSAs and APs on equal basis and without discrimination. 

  • 2020-08-25

    The American effort to invoke the snapback provision came a week after Security Council diplomats had dealt another embarrassing setback to the United States, rejecting its proposed resolution to extend an embargo on arms sales to Iran, which is scheduled to expire Oct. 18. 

  • 2020-08-22

    Russia’s permanent representative to the Vienna-based international organizations said on Saturday that the United States’ move to trigger snapback mechanism and return the UN sanctions on Iran go against “elementary common sense” as the U.S. is no longer a party to the JCPOA, the official name for the 2015 nuclear agreement.

  • 2020-08-22

    A group of Iranian lawmakers put forward a motion for an automatic withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal in case the activation of snapback mechanism in the JCPOA would re-impose the UN sanctions on Tehran.

  • 2020-08-22

    Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhao Lijian said the US is in no position to demand the return of all UN sanctions against Tehran through the so-called snapback provision in the 2015 nuclear deal.

  • 2020-08-21

    The Dispute Resolution Mechanism is only open to the actual JCOPA Participiants - and not to a defected "original" participiant that willfully and explicitly decided to "cease participation" , actively sought to destroy the instrument and subsequently - and self-admittedly - relinquished all its preorgatives and privileges. 

  • 2020-08-21

    China says the United States’ call for the re-imposition of the United Nations sanctions on Iran is ‘nothing but a self-serving political manipulation,’ stressing once again that Washington has no right to make such a demand after its unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal of 2015.

  • 2020-08-20

    A diplomatic standoff over restoring international sanctions against Iran may be the most vivid example yet of how the United States has largely isolated itself from the world order — instead of isolating Tehran, as the Trump administration intended.At nearly every step President Trump has taken in his dogged pursuit to demolish a 2015 accord limiting Iran’s nuclear program, he has run into opposition, including from America’s strongest allies in Europe.

  • 2020-08-20

    The Abadeh site, which Iran razed in July 2019, is the Amad Plan’s Marivan site, an important test site responsible for conducting large-scale high explosive tests for developing nuclear weapons. This report provides an introduction to the Marivan location and its activities based on information in the Nuclear Archive, a significant portion of which was seized by Israel in 2018 and shared widely. A Farsi-language slide set from the archive obtained recently by the Institute, containing ground photos of a large-scale test, enabled the Institute to independently evaluate, geo-locate, and, in light of other Archive reporting, ultimately confirm the Abadeh site as Marivan.

  • 2020-08-19

    The Trump administration continues its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, now with an attempt to restore pre-2015 UN sanctions, a right reserved for signatories to the nuclear deal it abandoned. Other UN Security Council members should disregard this gambit and urge Tehran not to overreact. [...] Conclusions: Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign has now been supplemented with a minimal diplomatic one – a futile effort to extend the UN’s arms restrictions followed by a disingenuous effort to reimpose all UN sanctions. Because the snapback procedures set out in the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 are airtight, the strictly legal outcome of a Security Council tug of war will be in doubt. But its political consequences ought not to be. By making clear their view that the U.S. lacks standing to trigger snapback, shrugging off its actions as meaningless and actively thwarting any step at the UN to revive the sanctions mechanisms, the rest of the Council – and in particular the P4 – can help sustain what is left of the nuclear deal. Iran, too, should avoid playing into U.S. hands by taking the Trump administration’s actions more seriously than they warrant. The Trump administration has made no secret of its ultimate goal, which is to bury the JCPOA once and for all. At this stage, there is one smart way to respond to its political antics: ignore them.

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