JOINT DECLARATION BY IRAN, TURKEY AND BRAZIL (17 May 2010) Having met in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, the undersigned have agreed on the following Declaration: 1. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT, recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination. ...
For the past few years, a political consensus has formed in the United States that Iran is covertly pursuing a nuclear-weapons program under the cloak of a civilian nuclear-power program. That conclusion has been based largely on a set of supposedly purloined top-secret Iranian military documents describing just such a covert program during 2002-03. The documents have often been referred to as the "laptop documents," but they include documents in both electronic and paper form and were called the "alleged studies" documents by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)."
After President Obama's press conference at the G20 summit, some experts were quick to declare that the Qom facility represented a gross violation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, which it had signed in 1974. The chorus of hawkish U.S. senators and congressmen, who have been trying to get the Obama administration to impose crippling sanctions on Iran, or even possibly to launch a military attack, also followed. The crucial question though is whether Iran violated its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement by failing to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intention to construct the Qom facility in a timely manner, and whether it violated the agreement by proceeding with its plan, again without first declaring it to the IAEA? If it has, it would indeed represent a gross violation of Iran's international obligations.
It is always difficult to evaluate a nuclear weapons program without access to concrete intelligence information. This study is based on open sources and we do not claim to be one hundred percent accurate and complete. The aim of the study is to try and get some insight into the level the Iranian Nuclear Program has progressed, and if the intent of the leadership is to produce nuclear weapons then what would the possible timeline be. Based on these estimates the study then addresses the possibility of an Israeli strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities, with the objective of either destroying the program or delaying it for some years. The success of the Strike Mission will be measured by how much of the Enrichment program it has destroyed, or the number of years it has delayed Iranian acquisition of enough Uranium, or Plutonium produced from the Arak reactor, to build a nuclear bomb.
2009-01-13U.S.-Iran Nuclear Negotiations in 1970s Featured Shah's Nationalism and U.S. Weapons Worries. Newly Declassified Documents Revea
Newly Declassified Documents Reveal Remarkable Continuity with Today's U.S.-Iran Nuclear Controversy. During the 1970s the Shah of Iran argued, like current Iranian leaders today, for a nuclear energy capability on the basis of national "rights," while the Ford and Carter administrations worried about nuclear weapons possibilities, according to newly declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive for the first time. Uranium enrichment capability is now the major point of controversy between Tehran and the world community, while during the 1970s Washington's greatest concern was that Iran sought a capability to produce plutonium, but in both instances the implication was that a nuclear weapons option might not be far away. ...
2008-02-22IAEA report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
1. On 15 November 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/58). This report covers the relevant developments since that date. 2. On 11 and 12 January 2008, the Director General met in Tehran with H.E. Ayatollah A. Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran; H.E. Mr. M. Ahmadinejad, President of Iran; H.E. Mr. G. Aghazadeh, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI); H.E. Mr. M. Mottaki, Foreign Minister; and H.E. Mr. S. Jalili, Secretary, Supreme National Security Council of Iran. The purpose of the visit was to discuss ways and means of implementing all relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council as well as accelerating implementation of the work plan agreed between Iran and the Secretariat on 21 August 2007 aimed at the clarification of outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment). 3. During the discussions, the Iranian leadership stated that the country’s nuclear programme had always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons development programme. The Iranian authorities agreed to accelerate implementation of the work plan.
A major U.S. intelligence review has concluded that Iran stopped work on a suspected nuclear weapons program more than four years ago, a stark reversal of previous intelligence assessments that Iran was actively moving toward a bomb.
2007-11-01Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. National Intelligence Estimate. By the Office of the Director of National Intelligenc
This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, itexamines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature. ..
2007-06-11Inquiry into 'Iran's Nuclear Programme'. Memorandum from Elahe Mohtasham. Senior Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Centr
Much of the debate about the 'Iranian nuclear threat' is driven not so much by any hard evidence about a weapon driven programme but by fear that Iran's mastery of civilian technology would provide the means to rapidly develop a weapons capability should she wish to do so in future. ...
2006-03-06U.S. endorsed Iranian plans to build massive nuclear energy industry. Cheney Rumsfeld & Wolfowitz behind Iran Nuclear Program in
In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford signed a directive that granted Iran the opportunity to purchase U.S. built reprocessing equipment and facilities designed to extract plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel.