Nuclear Issue

  • 2020-06-19

    The IAEA Board of Governors today adopted a resolution calling on the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA in implementing its NPT Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and satisfy the IAEA's requests without further delay. (NPT refers to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). 

  • 2020-06-19

    The IAEA Board of Governors today adopted a resolution calling on the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA in implementing its NPT Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and satisfy the IAEA's requests without further delay. (NPT refers to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). 

  • 2020-06-19

    The resolution was passed by 25 votes in favor, two against, with seven abstentions: South Africa, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Niger. Russia and China, two other permanent members of the UN Security Council and signatories to the JCPOA, voted against. In a post on his Twitter account, Russia’s Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov called on Iran and the IAEA to settle issues pertaining to the two nuclear sites "without delay." "We believe that the resolution can be counter productive," he tweeted. The Chinese diplomatic mission to the IAEA also warned on Twitter that the resolution could have "huge implications" for the future of the JCPOA.

  • 2020-06-17

    Despite the nuclear deal’s slow-motion collapse, observers don’t expect Iran to open up the throttle on its program—at least not before the U.S. elections in November. If Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden wins, the next administration “may try to resurrect some form of the JCPOA,” Stricker says. “And the Iranians would probably want to test and see what they can get

  • 2020-06-16

    This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will convene its Board of Governors virtually for the first time in its history. In the weeks leading up to the meeting, much attention has been given to the Agency’s outstanding request to visit two sites in Iran where there may have been undeclared nuclear activity, suspected to have occurred in 2003. These requests are based on the Israeli-obtained “atomic archive” which Mossad allegedly stole from a warehouse outside of Tehran in early 2018. 

  • 2020-06-10

    Based on all the available information, the Abadeh Development site is the location currently in question by the IAEA, thought to have been involved in outdoor high explosives testing in the 2003 timeframe. After 2003, when commercial satellite imagery is available, the site has exhibited evidence of personnel presence, such as in a 2006 satellite imagery, and lighter signs of activity around 2012 and 2013, and again around 2018, which may have continued up until its razing in mid-summer 2019. The Abadeh site was apparently preserved for some time after 2003. Abadeh is in a very remote part of Iran, possibly leading the Amad Plan leaders to leave it intact post-2003, either for additional testing or on stand-by.

  • 2020-05-28

    Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations says the US has destroyed the last means of retention of the 2015 nuclear agreement between the Islamic Republic and major world powers by ending waivers for sanctions prohibiting nuclear cooperation with Tehran. 

  • 2020-05-11

    In “Trump’s JCPOA Withdrawal Two Years On – Maximum Pressure, Minimum Outcomes” author David Mortlock, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, evaluates the policy outcomes of President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. The author walks readers through the timeline of President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, the subsequent implementation of the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, and the policy outcomes relative to stated objectives. In sum, Mortlock concludes that although the maximum pressure campaign has been effective in inflicting economic harm on Iran, it has had minimum effect in other areas. Therefore, Mortlock believes the Trump administration should seize the opportunity to pivot from maximum pressure to an approach focused more on policy outcomes.

  • 2020-05-07

    When Trump withdrew from the Iran deal in 2018, he chose not to use the so-called “snapback” measure which would restore all the U.N. sanctions suspended by the deal. John Bolton, then the national security adviser, explained that “we are not using the provisions…because we are out of the deal.” Yet Pompeo is now saying that the U.S. is still a legal participant and so entitled to use snapback even though the administration has repeatedly touted “ceasing” its participation. […] Today, returning to the Iran nuclear deal would largely be a bilateral matter between the U.S. and Iran. The two countries could simply return to compliance with their obligations under the deal. After snapback, any return to the deal would require new action at the Security Council, thus allowing other parties — again, most especially Russia and China — to seek concessions.  That does not mean a Biden administration would not return. Being stuck implementing Trump’s Iran policy ad infinitum is an unattractive proposition. But the U.S. would probably need to pay a price to undo Trump’s mess. As with all the hawks’ moves, the snapback idea will fail to achieve its purported objectives with Iran, but not before doing real damage to U.S. interests.

  • 2020-05-01

    Even the Trump administration seems to grudgingly have concluded that breaching the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) was a mistake. More than two years after the U.S. exit, the deal still stands while the Trump administration is running out of options to force a re-negotiation. It is now so desperate it is seeking to convince the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that it never quit the deal in the first place. The lesson to the U.S. is clear: Diplomatic vandalism carries costs — even for a superpower. The lesson to a prospective President Joe Biden is more specific: Rejoin the nuclear deal, don’t try to renegotiate it.

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