The resolution was passed by 25 votes in favor, two against, with seven abstentions: South Africa, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Niger. Russia and China, two other permanent members of the UN Security Council and signatories to the JCPOA, voted against. In a post on his Twitter account, Russia’s Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov called on Iran and the IAEA to settle issues pertaining to the two nuclear sites "without delay." "We believe that the resolution can be counter productive," he tweeted. The Chinese diplomatic mission to the IAEA also warned on Twitter that the resolution could have "huge implications" for the future of the JCPOA.

This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will convene its Board of Governors virtually for the first time in its history. In the weeks leading up to the meeting, much attention has been given to the Agency’s outstanding request to visit two sites in Iran where there may have been undeclared nuclear activity, suspected to have occurred in 2003. These requests are based on the Israeli-obtained “atomic archive” which Mossad allegedly stole from a warehouse outside of Tehran in early 2018. 

Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations says the US has destroyed the last means of retention of the 2015 nuclear agreement between the Islamic Republic and major world powers by ending waivers for sanctions prohibiting nuclear cooperation with Tehran. 

When Trump withdrew from the Iran deal in 2018, he chose not to use the so-called “snapback” measure which would restore all the U.N. sanctions suspended by the deal. John Bolton, then the national security adviser, explained that “we are not using the provisions…because we are out of the deal.” Yet Pompeo is now saying that the U.S. is still a legal participant and so entitled to use snapback even though the administration has repeatedly touted “ceasing” its participation. […] Today, returning to the Iran nuclear deal would largely be a bilateral matter between the U.S. and Iran. The two countries could simply return to compliance with their obligations under the deal. After snapback, any return to the deal would require new action at the Security Council, thus allowing other parties — again, most especially Russia and China — to seek concessions.  That does not mean a Biden administration would not return. Being stuck implementing Trump’s Iran policy ad infinitum is an unattractive proposition. But the U.S. would probably need to pay a price to undo Trump’s mess. As with all the hawks’ moves, the snapback idea will fail to achieve its purported objectives with Iran, but not before doing real damage to U.S. interests.