President Biden said on the sidelines of a Nov. 4 election rally that the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran is “dead,” but stressed the U.S. won’t formally announce it, according to a new video that surfaced on social media late Monday.

Leaked Fars News bulletin to IRGC chief highlights intra-Iranian dispute on the direction of the nuclear talks with Washington

Rather than a traditional nuclear weapons program, Iran threatens the world with a program ready to produce nuclear weapons “on-demand.” Its readiness program poses a difficult challenge to the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Due to its past, large-scale nuclear weapons program, called the Amad Plan, Iran has a readiness program with less need for secret nuclear weapon development activities. Iran has advanced its nuclear weapons readiness under civilian nuclear and military non-nuclear cover projects. Using a civilian cover, Iran has in recent years successfully produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) and near HEU metal. Understanding the pace of Iran building nuclear weapons matters, in particular, for designing strategies against Iran moving to construct them.

This report summarizes and assesses information in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) quarterly report for November 10, 2022, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), including Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and updates issued on November 22 and 29, 2022. Iran continues to deploy advanced centrifuges at its three enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow in violation of the limitations outlined in the JCPOA. Under a revived JCPOA, Iran would be permitted to mothball its advanced centrifuges, shortening Iran’s breakout timeline and increasing its ability to build up its capability should the deal collapse or once enrichment capacity restrictions phase out starting in 2025. Iran continues to sideline the IAEA and has significantly reduced its ability to monitor Iran’s complex and growing nuclear program, which notably has undeclared nuclear materials and activities. The IAEA’s ability to detect diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and other capabilities to undeclared facilities remains greatly diminished. In a recent press conference, as reported by the Jerusalem Post, IAEA Director General Grossi stated there is a “mass of activity about which we don’t know anything.”