• 2020-02-10

    While Iraqi officials insist that they should not be forced to choose between the United States and Iran, the recent growth in Iranian trade and investment ties points to a cooperative vision for economic development that American policymakers appear to lack. Rather than advance American interests through greater support for the Iraqi economy, the Trump administration has fixated solely on the denial of Iranian interests. As a consequence, even if the administration succeeds in advancing its “maximum pressure” strategy by expelling Iranian firms from Iraq, it remains totally ill-equipped to compensate for the serious harm that will be inflicted on Iraq at a time when the country is gripped by economic protests. Absent a considered strategy to support regional economic development, the United States is bound to remain mired in a forever war with both Iraq and Iran.

  • 2020-02-05

    Last November, eight members of the House and Senate met privately with a representative of a group that advocates for the “overthrow of the Islamic Republic in Iran.” Six of these members of Congress had received maximum contributions from the regime-change activist during the previous election; two of them, Senators Ted Cruz and Marsha Blackburn, sit on the powerful Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, respectively.

  • 2020-01-30

    Since the 1979 revolution, Iran's politics have changed dramatically from a one-party system heavily dominated by clerics to a multi-party system dominated by lay politicians. Iran’s parliament is illustrative. Iranians will head to the polls on Feb. 21, 2020 to elect the 11th parliament.

  • 2020-01-26

    Answering a question about the performance of the petrochemical industry, the petroleum minister said, “We hope that the second petrochemical leap will be achieved by the year 2021, with the realization of which the annual petrochemical production capacity will be around 100 million tonnes and the value of the produced items will be close to $27 billion.” He further said the projects that would reach fruition after then would be categorized in the third leap of the industry. By the end of the leap, Iran’s petrochemical production capacity is envisaged to cross 136 million tons per annum and the value of the produced items will generate $37 billion for the country.

  • 2020-01-24

    In general, China-Gulf relations are evolving within a context that is characterized by global and regional geopolitical power transitions. For a long time, political-security arrangements in the Persian Gulf region had been based on a “balance of power” among countries such as Iran and the United States.  Moreover, there have been major changes in international energy markets and a deteriorating security situation in the region that has once more become subject to geopolitical tensions. In order to understand the rationale and implications of China’s stance towards the Persian Gulf countries as well as the scope and degree of the Gulf monarchies’ reaction to China’s deepening ties with Iran, it is necessary to dive into each of these dimensions.

  • 2020-01-24

    In November 2018, Iran, Iraq, and Syria reached a provisional agreement to build a “land-bridge” railroad and highway corridor extending from the Persian Gulf in Iran through Iraq to the Mediterranean port of Latakia in Syria, a distance of 1,570 km (975 miles). In combination with the Belt and Road Initiative, it could transform the intervening three nations. The construction of the first phase of the project is soon to begin.

  • 2020-01-21

    Key Points: Ο The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces are organized around headquarters that are meant to coordinate the operations of Iranian paramilitary forces and support the Quds Force’s use of proxy groups such as Iraqi Shi’a militias abroad. Ο Their basing in Iran indicates a primary focus on suppressing internal unrest and waging irregular warfare in the rear of an invader rather than on defending against an invasion conventionally. Ο Their organizational structure and the pattern of their operations in Syria suggest that they might be challenged to coordinate large-scale (multi-division) operations abroad and possibly at home. Ο The fact that the Iranian leadership has not yet had to use them on a large scale to suppress growing domestic unrest suggests that the regime still has a potent reserve force to ensure its survival even if the unrest grows considerably, as long as it does not also face a requirement for large-scale military operations abroad

  • 2020-01-21

    Britain supported Iran’s new Islamic regime in crushing the last remaining opposition to its rule in 1983 while the UK’s leading official in the country joked about Iran’s torture techniques, declassified files reveal. 

  • 2020-01-21

    Financial Times reports Washington’s ‘covert’ efforts are now increasing, and are more out in the open: US government-funded technology companies have recorded an increase in the use of circumvention software in Iran in recent weeks after boosting efforts to help Iranian anti-regime protesters thwart internet censorship and use secure mobile messaging. The outreach is part of a US government program dedicated to internet freedom that supports dissident pressure inside Iran and complements America’s policy of “maximum pressure” over the regime. A US state department official told the Financial Times that since protests in Iran in 2018 — at the time the largest in almost a decade — Washington had accelerated efforts to provide Iranians more options on how they communicate with each other and the outside world. 

  • 2020-01-21

    Iran’s civil aviation agency has released its second preliminary investigative report on the accidental shooting down of a Ukrainian passenger plane near Tehran earlier this month. The report, published by the Civil Aviation Organization of Islamic Republic of Iran (CAO.IRI) on Monday, includes detailed technical information about the Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. 

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