China and Iran recently signed a major 25 year agreement to enhance comprehensive cooperation in a range of fields including trade. After the signing of the agreement, some Western Media Outlets tried to depict the agreement negatively. Some claimed that this agreement met with backlash in Iran. What is the actual situation? Will the agreement implementation be influenced by US sanctions? How does Iran evaluate its cooperation with China? Iranian Ambassador to China, Mohammad Keshavarzzadeh shared his views on these issues.
International experts view the China-Iran agreement, based on its content and timing, as a political maneuver against the nuclear deal, which has been going back and forth between the Biden and Tehran administrations. While some claim that the indecisiveness of the Biden administration in returning to the nuclear deal with Iran is moving Iran increasingly closer to China, others see the deal as a “game changer” for Iran. On the other hand, given Iran’s recent experience with both China and the US, we can argue that the agreement is not a “game changer” for Iran’s foreign policy in the international arena, but rather “a part of the current plan”. This is because this issue is essentially a global one that transcends Iran’s bilateral relations with the two countries, is intertwined with the global rivalry between the US and China, and moves in cycles at the regional level. In this context, three points must be considered in order to thoroughly assess the agreement’s impact on bilateral relations: the dynamics of the global power transition between China and the US, China’s general Middle East policy, which has been gradually taking shape since 2016 as an extension of its power transition project, and the “multilateralism” policy followed by Iran at a global level.
The countries signed a sweeping pact on Saturday that calls for heavy Chinese investments in Iran over 25 years in exchange for oil — a step that could ease Iran’s international isolation.
2021-03-19Presidential Elections in Iran: Procedures, Candidates, and the Persistent Clout of Key Institutions
As the Islamic Republic prepares for the June 18 presidential election, Iranian and international media are boiling over with speculations concerning who is likely to prevail and how the outcome may impact Iran’s relations with the United States. A review of the basic procedures and political dynamics of presidential elections as well as strategic decision making in Iran since 1979 serves as a cautionary antidote to such speculation: If history is any guide, serious presidential contenders will not join the race until five weeks prior to the election, and the president is but one among multiple institutional decision makers in Iran’s highest strategic decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council.
Former US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, who during the Obama Administration played a pivotal role in negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, recently asserted in an interview with CNBC that “there are probably … about 10 weeks left for some serious diplomacy … before the Iranian elections will naturally call for a bit of a reset.” That certainly is an understatement. While experience suggests that Iran’s electoral politics can produce sudden and sometimes welcome surprises, the chances that the June 18 presidential election will go to a hard-liner are very strong.
Welcome to the inaugural entry in the Jadaliyya Iran Page’s newest series Dowreh, from the Persian word meaning (among other things) conversation circle or salon. In this series, we invite scholars, intellectuals, and artists to stage conversations from within, adjacent to, and beyond Iranian studies, with an eye to de-nationalizing our discourses and expanding the terrain of our conversations. In particular, this series looks to bring together intellectuals in both likely and unlikely pairings, asking them to address how they approach their work to make scholarly or pedagogical connections across disparate geographies, temporalities, or objects of inquiry. The first in this series features two U.S.-based scholars of transnational feminist studies, Minoo Moallem and Mimi Thi Nguyen.
2021-03-08Analysis: Iran slips record volume of oil into China, reaches out to Asian clients for trade resumption
Iran has quietly moved record amounts of crude oil to top client China in recent months, while India’s state refiners have added Iranian oil to their annual import plans on the assumption that U.S. sanctions on the OPEC supplier will soon ease, according to six industry sources and Refinitiv data. U.S. President Joe Biden has sought to revive talks with Iran on a nuclear deal abandoned by former President Donald Trump in 2018, although harsh economic measures remain in place that Tehran insists be lifted before negotiations resume. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) has started reaching out to customers across Asia since Biden took office to assess potential demand for its crude, said the sources, who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the matter.
2021-03-06Iran-Russia Relationship: Requisites for Transition from Meager Tactical Actualities to Actualization of Deep Strategic Potentia
On March 12, 2001, a near-comprehensive agreement was reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in Moscow. The agreement was signed by Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s president at the time, and Vladimir Putin as the Russian president. It has been in place for 20 years and is about to expire in a few days and needs to be either extended or replaced with another much more comprehensive and strategically-oriented long-term agreement. An important written message from Ayatullah Khamenei to President Putin was delivered by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the head of the Iranian Parliament, on Monday, February 8, 2021. It appears the latter scenario (i.e. a comprehensive long-term agreement) is inevitably the case.
In this issue: 1. Be auspicious March 8, International Women's Day. 2. With the strongest possible term, the summoning of Ali Nejati, the retired worker and a board member director of Haft Tappeh Sugarcane Syndicate is condemned!. 3. Statement of Independent Workers', Retirees', and Teachers' Organizations on the 2021 Minimum Wage. 4. Manifesto of the workers of ‘Hepco’ “Do not make the workers an instrument, pay our wages.”. 5. The workers of the ‘southern Tehran’ company .... 6. Notification for Ali Nejati, the retired worker and one of board members of the Syndicate of Haft Tappeh Sugarcane, to begin his 5 years sentence. 7. Three members of the Syndicate of Bus Company workers were called by branch 2 of the Evin court to show up to the security police!. 8. What women want. 9. Brief news. 10. We condemn the court summons of Ali Nejati, our retired colleague!
Despite ongoing tensions with Iran, the UAE has maintained a limited degree of engagement. How these relations develop in the future will, to a significant extent, be shaped by the trajectory of the likely upcoming negotiations between Iran and the United States, along with the Europeans. For now, what is clear is that bilateral trade, diplomatic ties, and humanitarian efforts offer a supportive backdrop for the major nuclear diplomacy and related efforts to come.