In mid-August, while the world was focused on understanding the orientation of the newly-inaugurated government of Ayatollah Seyed Ebrahim Raisi, Iran’s top security official, Ali Shamkhani, dropped a bombshell that continues to reverberate across the West Asia region. After a phone call with his Russian counterpart Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council announced that Iran will soon become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ending a 16-year-period of being on the sidelines of the China-led, economy-oriented regional institution.
Raisi’s new cabinet is largely composed of men he has deemed “expert, efficient and revolutionary.” The emphasis on “revolutionary” reflects a politicisation of economic policymaking that emerged during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency (2013-2021). As Iran faced multilateral and unilateral sanctions, advocates for diplomacy and the 2015 nuclear deal sought the lifting of sanctions to boost economic prospects. But many hardliners, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, prefer to look inward to solve Iran’s economic problems. They promote the “resistance economy” model in which Iran would seek to neutralize the impact of sanctions. These lawmakers and officials favor reducing dependence on imports by raising domestic production and replacing foreign technologies with those made at home. Should imports be necessary, they support increased trade with Russia and China as opposed to Western countries, which they consider unreliable. With Raisi in office, the proponents of the resistance economy are in control of both the legislative and executive branches. The question is to what extent they can implement the resistance economy model given its inherent limitations. As a pragmatic move, Raisi’s team may also push for the lifting of U.S. sanctions and reintegration into the global economy, which were priorities of the Rouhani administration. The following are profiles of Raisi’s cabinet ministers responsible for managing the economy.
On Aug. 11, 2021, President Ebrahim Raisi submitted a list of 19 proposed cabinet members to Parliament, the Majles, which must approve all nominations. Two weeks later, Parliament approved all of his picks with the exception of his proposed education minister. Raisi’s new cabinet includes five ministers who are designated under U.S. sanctions. Raisi, his chief of staff Gholamhossein Esmaili, and his first vice president Mohammad Mokhber have also been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury. Four members of the cabinet were members of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), with three holding the rank of brigadier general. […]
With the electoral victory of Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi, Iran is potentially undergoing a dramatic shift in its political landscape. After eight years and two presidential terms in control of the executive branch of government, the centrist ‘Moderates’ (e’tedaaliyoun) have suffered a heavy political defeat against the conservative ‘Principlist’ (osulgeraa) camp. In the midst of this, the ‘Reformist’ (eslaahtalab) faction, which once mobilized masses to elevate the Moderate Hassan Rouhani into the presidency in 2013 and to his reelection in 2017, has lost its political capital and appeal. It will take years for Reformists to recover and reemerge as a political force. A comeback would require nothing short of a generational transition within the camp and their reformulation of what reformism actually means in the Islamic Republic of today.
Professor Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran summed up for me the road map ahead: “Iran’s foreign policy decisions are pretty clear. Iran will be putting less emphasis on Western nations, especially European, and more emphasis on the Global South, the East, neighboring countries, and of course that will include China and Russia. That doesn’t mean the Iranians are going to ignore Europe altogether, if they decide to return to the JCPOA. The Iranians would accept if they abide by their obligations. So far, we have seen no sign of that whatsoever.” Marandi could not help referring to Khamenei’s speech: “It’s pretty clear; he’s saying, ‘we don’t trust the West, these last 8 years showed that’, he’s saying the next administration should learn from the experience of these 8 years.” Yet the main challenge for Raisi will not be foreign policy, but the domestic framework, with sanctions still biting hard: “With regard to economic policy, it will be tilting more towards social justice and turning away from neoliberalism, expanding the safety net for the disenfranchised and the vulnerable.”
2021-08-02Reflections on the State of Democracy in Iran after the 2021 Elections: An Elegy for the Voting Non-Voter
As expected, Ebrahim Raisi became president-elect on 18 June 2021, winning with eighteen million votes, more than half a million votes less than Rouhani received in his first run, eight million fewer than the second. Second place went to four million spoiled ballots […] Thirty million Iranians chose not to vote in 2021, resulting in a participation rate of forty-eight percent, reduced to a dreary forty-two percent if voided ballots are included. Either figure counts as the lowest ever recorded in the forty-two-year history of the Islamic Republic, a regime that has long prided itself on its ability to mobilize the population at election time.
The student, Bijan Bazargan, was among an estimated 5,000 prisoners belonging to armed opposition and leftist groups in Iran, who Amnesty International and other rights groups say were executed in the summer of 1988. Now, a Swedish court will prosecute a former Iranian judiciary official for war crimes and murder in connection with Mr. Bazargan’s death. The case carries some notably public and damaging implications for Iran’s president-elect, Ebrahim Raisi, who helped decide which prisoners lived or died during those mass executions.
Iran’s presidential election is scheduled for June 18. Registration for candidates began on May 11, and seven candidates were selected to run on May 25.
Iran is parched. Indeed, this year is expected to be among the driest in the last 50 years. Of the country’s 85 million people, some 28 million people live in water-stressed areas, mostly in the central and southern regions. Water scarcity is hitting all segments of society, from urban households to rural farming communities. Iran isn’t alone in its plight. Of the 17 most water-stressed states in the world, 12 are in the Middle East and North Africa, which includes all the littoral states of the Persian Gulf. In tackling the region’s water challenges, Iran and its Arab neighbors to the south have much to gain by accepting the need for regional cooperation to promote water security while minimizing harm to the Persian Gulf’s ecology. In fact, regional cooperation in this area is an easy mark and one U.S. President Joe Biden has good reasons to encourage given his administration’s focus on combatting climate change.
Assistance by one of Israel’s most important friends to its greatest enemy has risen steadily under Xi Jinping. The closer relations between Beijing and Tehran, which include joint military exercises, a significant strategic agreement, and according to reports, assistance to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, demand serious attention in Jerusalem – as well as throughout the Middle East and Washington